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SHOULD RACIALLY BIASED HATE
SPEECH BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY
THAN OTHER FORMS OF SPEECH?

Alessandra Hermetz
In popular memory and most published accounts, The
First Amendment of the US Constitution promises that, among
other things, "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. " 1 At face value, the mean
ing of the First Amendment appears self-evident: the US Gov
ernment cannot pass any law that in any way restricts what
people can say or publish in the United States. But this inter
pretation, and support for complete freedom of speech, be
comes more difficult when one considers the wide variety of
shocking, offensive, cruel and appalling things people can
come up with to say to and about each other. Interestingly,
early in United States history the First Amendment was not
seen by the government as the binding agreement to refrain
from restricting all speech that it is viewed as today; in fact,
within just a few years of the First Amendment becoming part
of the Constitution, there were successful (albeit, unpopular
and quickly overturned) attempts to criminalize certain unfa
vorable speech directed at the government. Anthony Lewis
1

Note: For the purposes of this essay, speech includes both direct
and symbolic speech-so, not only spoken and written words, but
also actions taken in order to communicate a message. This follows
the meaning of the word as it is used by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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notes that, although this early speech law never went to the
Supreme Court, "if it had been, the Court would almost cer
tainly have upheld the law."2 Today, the interpretation of the
First Amendment accepted by the United States Supreme
Court has shifted closer to the face-value reading of the First
Amendment, and both state governments and the federal gov
ernment are held to high standards of speech protection. Cur
rently, restrictions on speech must pass strict scrutiny tests,
meaning that those defending the law must demonstrate both
that the speech issue could not be handled some other way and
that the problem is pressing enough to warrant legal re
striction. 3 This is a test that is extremely difficult to pass, and
most restrictions targeted at speech fail to pass this test, result
ing in a legal culture in which legislators rarely attempt to
make restrictions on speech and in which people are free to
say more or less whatever they want to (and any brief survey
of social media will reveal that many are quite happy to take
full advantage of this freedom).
In this paper, I will discuss two Supreme Court cases
concerning legislation with which state and local governments
attempted, and ultimately failed, to punish a specific category
of speech: racially biased hate speech. My goal is to demon
strate that, although current United States Supreme Court doc
trine holds that laws specifically targeting racially biased hate
speech are unconstitutional, the nature of racially biased hate
speech is such that it should be a legitimate exception to the
rule that law cannot proscribe the expression of certain ideas.
In the first section of this paper, I will overview the
court cases, providing the arguments the Court gave for each
Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate (New
York: Basic Books, 2007), 11, 15.
3 John T. Bennett, "The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation," Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 43: 456--458, https://advance-lexis
com.libproxy.furman.edu/api/permalink/57c4e61b-1fl 0-416a-bfl39586bfilbeb9e/?context= l516831.
2
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decision. In the second section, I will compare these argu
ments to the classic argument in favor of free speech presented
by John Stuart Mill. In the third section, I will present argu
ments in favor of hate speech regulation from critical race the
orists. In the fourth section, I will present responses to these
critical race theorists from modem scholars who oppose hate
speech regulation. And in the final section, I will present my
own critique of the Supreme Court's decisions and counterar
guments to the arguments presented by Mill and those oppo
nents of hate speech regulation discussed in the third section.
I will also attempt to present a version of hate speech law that
would allow hate speech to be legally recognized as unac
ceptable, while avoiding some of the consequences that those
opposed to hate speech regulation fear.
Supreme Court Cases
The United States Supreme Court cases I will focus
on are R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul and Virginia v. Black (referred
to throughout the rest of this paper as R.A. V. and Virginia, re
spectively). The first case, RA. V., concerns a teenager who
was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi
nance for burning a cross in a black family's front yard. 4 The
United States Supreme Court found that the St. Paul ordinance
was "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses." 5 That is to say, the law was unconstitutional be
cause it proscribed speech based on its content-it specifically
targeted speech that "arouses anger... on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender" as legally unacceptable, but
left speech that arouses anger on other bases protected. The
court explained that, while the ordinance only applied to bi4
5

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.
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ased speech that constituted "fighting words," which the Su
preme Court has recognized as proscribable, it was unconsti
tutional because it effectively allowed the government to pick
and choose which topics of fighting words were acceptable
and which were not. ("Fighting words" is a term for a category
of speech first recognized as proscribable by the Supreme
Court in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire and is defined by the
Court as words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.")6 As Justice
Antonin Scalia explained in his opinion for the Court, this law
could create a situation in which one side of a debate could say
whatever it wanted to, whereas the other side could not-he
explains this by presenting a hypothetical situation in which a
person could say "that all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegot
ten; but not that all 'papists' are"; and so Catholics would be
permitted to use whatever language they like, but anti-Catho
lics would be limited to tamer speech. 7
In the second case, Virginia, the Court examined a law
which "makes it a felony 'for any person . . . , with the intent
of intimidating any person or group . . . , to bum . . . a cross on
the property of another, a highway or other public place,' and
specifies that '[a]ny such burning . . . shall be prima facie evi
dence of an intent to intimidate a person or group. "'8 The Su
preme Court held that intimidation is a legitimate exception to
First Amendment protection, as well as that states could spe
cifically ban cross burning when the intent of the cross burning
is to intimidate; however, the Court found the statute uncon
stitutional as it was written, because of its prima facie assump
tion that cross burning was always intended to intimidate. 9 In

6

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.
8
Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003).
9
Note: prima facie comes from the Latin for "at first sight," and
means that something is taken to be true unless proved otherwise.
7
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her opinion for the court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ex
plained that "the act of burning a cross may mean that a person
is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation, or it
may mean only that the person is engaged in core political
speech."e1 0 In other words, to assume that cross burning in
every case is intended to intimidate could be to punish some
one who burned a cross not in order to intimidate, but rather
to make a point that contributes to political discussion. Inter
estingly, the court held that cross burning could be specifically
banned because of the historical association of cross burning
with the Ku Klux Klan, known for its extreme racial violence
and hate speech, but that this was consistent with the decision
in RA. V. because the Virginia statute did not specify that cross
burning was illegal when intended to intimidate based on reli
gion, race or sex; it simply restricted cross burning in all cases
in which it was intended to intimidate.
The Virginia decision could be seen as a victory for
supporters of hate speech regulation, and it is certainly more
of a victory than RA. V., but, as we will see below, its failure
to specifically condemn racially biased hate speech and the
Court's rejection that cross burning can be taken to always im
ply intimidation, despite the fact that the Court acknowledged
its association with racial violence and intimidation, means
that it is not the direct kind of restriction on hate speech that
hate speech regulation advocates desire.
A Classic Free Speech Argument
As mentioned above, in the United States' infancy the
Supreme Court likely would not have been as opposed to spe
cific content discrimination in either state or federal law as it
For more clarification, see the entry on Prima facie in the Wex le
gal dictionary from Cornell Law School's Legal Information Insti
tute, https://www.law.comell.edu/wex/prima_facie.
10

Virginia v. Black
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is today. While it might seem unbelievable to us now, in 1798
the Senate passed a bill which criminalized "any false, scan
dalous and malicious writing or writings against the govern
ment of the United States, or either house of the Congress . . .
or the President." 1 1 Called the Sedition Act, this law was a di
rect content restriction on negative writings about the govern
ment. The arguments used in the United States for shifting
away from laws such as the Sedition Act echo arguments
found in John Stuart Mill's book On Liberty, published in
1859. In this book, Mill argues that (almost) no speech should
be regulated, because all speech, even speech that is consid
ered "false and pernicious," can contribute to the exchange of
ideas and pursuit of truth. 1 2 Mill sees three reasons not to reg
ulate speech in general. First, he argues that "all silencing of
discussion is an assumption of infallibility"; 13 that is to say,
when the government chooses to punish certain speech or
ideas, it is assuming that it knows what the correct opinion
should be. Mill notes that throughout history, historical figures
that in Mill's day were considered great teachers, such as Jesus
and Socrates, were executed for spreading supposedly bad
ideas in the time periods in which they lived. 1 4 Another reason
Mill provides to not regulate even negatively-viewed speech
is that often, the so-called false opinion and so-called true
opinion both contain part of the truth; he claims that it is rare
that one is completely true and the other completely false and,
therefore, access to both sides of an argument are necessary in
order to come to the truth. 1 5
Mill's next reason not to regulate any kind of speech
is that any opinion, "however true . . . if it is not fully, fre
quently, and fearlessly discussed. . . will be held as a dead
11

Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That we Hate, 11.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Hackett,
1978), 18-19.
13
Mill, On Liberty, 17.
14
Mill, 23.
15
Mill, 44.
12

6

Alessandra Hermetz
dogma, not a living truth." 1 6 Mill explains that, in order for an
idea not to become a dead dogma (that is, a kind of blindly,
unquestioningly accepted catechism, rather than a compelling
intellectual idea), those who hold that idea must be exposed to
objections to that idea. What's more, he argues, in order for
the hearer to receive the "most plausible and most persuasive
form" of the opposing argument, the objections must be pre
sented by those who believe the so-called false view, rather
than by someone who simply knows the argument but does not
believe it. 1 7 This would require those holding the false idea to
be allowed to speak their beliefs exactly as they believe them,
rather than presenting the idea in a tame, third-person kind of
way.
Mill was specifically concerned with the kind of si
lencing of religious and political discussion present in England
and the early United States. Historical speech laws often in
cluded what would be categorized as content-based re
strictions on speech that today we recognize as valuable, such
as political and religious dissent. By restricting certain con
tent, these laws regulated the ideas presented in the speech,
rather than simply the aggressive nature or fighting-word sta
tus of such speech, and were legitimized by arguments that the
regulated speech was either untrue or of such offensive nature
that it should not be permitted in public discourse. Under
standing this context of speech repression is important to un
derstanding why Mill argued in favor of nearly total freedom
of speech and why it is now so difficult to argue for regulation
directed at a specific subject of speech in the United States,
even when the speech is deeply offensive and recognized to be
based on untruth, as racially-biased hate speech is.
It should be noted that Mill allows for some speech (or
actions in general) to be regulated when such action or speech

16
17

Mill, 34.
Mill, On Liberty, 35.
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would cause specific harm to others. 1 8 This idea is often called
the harm principle. (It can be argued that hate speech directly
causes harm to others, both physically and mentally, although,
since Mill's focus was not on hate speech, he does not address
this possibility; I will address this idea further in the subse
quent sections of this paper.) Mill's only example of a case in
which speech causes justly regulable harm is the case of a man
inciting an angry mob by declaring that "com dealers are starv
ers of the poor." 1 9 Mill explains that, in this case, the speech
is not regulable because of the idea it expresses, but rather be
cause it occurs in front of an angry mob gathered at the house
of a com dealer and will most likely incite them to harm the
com dealer; to Mill, such speech would be acceptable if it did
not occur in that specific context. 20 Because much of what is
considered hate speech by its broadest definition (which
would include not only angry incitements to violence but also
racist speech in general) is not presented in a directly compa
rable manner to this example, it would seem that Mill would
only support regulating hate speech that can be seen as a direct
incitement to harm, if he were to enter the discussion today.
Mill's harm principle is similar in many ways to the fighting
words doctrine discussed in Chaplinksy, R.A. V. and Virginia,
because the nature of fighting words is to either incite or inflict
harm.
An Argument from Critical Race Theory
Those who support regulation of racially charged hate
speech, whether embodied in state legal codes or in the rules
of public colleges, find themselves in a tight spot in the face
of the reversal of historical speech laws and current legal doc18
19
20

8

Mill, 9.
Mill, On Liberty, 53.
Mill, 54.
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trine on hate speech. Although advocates of hate speech re
strictions want such restrictions not to end political discussion,
but rather to protect those people who have historically been
subject to extreme discrimination and violence based on their
membership in minority groups (for example, race, gender, re
ligion, and sexual orientation), such advocates are often des
ignated as "thought police" by opponents, a designation that
implies that they do not support open discussion. 2 1 In this sec
tion, I want to examine the view held by some of the most
outspoken supporters of hate speech regulation, the critical
race theorists, and why they think that racially biased hate
speech can be treated as an exception to the rule that govern
ment cannot implement content-based restrictions on speech.
Critical race theory is based on six "defining ele
ments," presented in Words That Wound as follows:
Critical race theory recognizes that racism is endemic
to American life . . . . Critical race theory expresses
skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutral
ity, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy . . . .
Critical race theory challenges ahistoricism and in
sists on a contextual/historical analysis of the law . . . .
Critical race theory insists on recognition of the ex
periential knowledge of people of color. . . in analyz
ing law and society. . . . Critical race theory is inter
disciplinary and eclectic . . . . [and] Critical race theory
works toward the end of eliminating racial oppres
sion as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of
oppression. 22

21

Charles R. Lawrence III et. al, eds., introduction to Words That
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First
Amendment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 2.
22
Lawrence et. al, introduction to Words that Wound, 6.
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Based on these beliefs and goals, critical race theorists argue
that racially biased hate speech can be legitimately singled out
for restriction, despite the fact that this would create a content
based restriction, because of the long history of racial discrim
ination such speech embodies and because eliminating such
speech would help alleviate the still-existing problems faced
by racial minorities today. The critical race theorists often pro
vide personal examples of being subjected to hate speech in
order to support their claims; one such example is a "rash of
hate tracts [that]. . . appeared in [their] mail," an experience
which caused them to "[walk] more quickly to [their] cars after
late nights at the office and [to glance] more often over [their]
shoulders as [they] jogged the trails around [their] cam
puses." 23 Charles Lawrence III provides another personal ex
ample, writing about a hate speech incident directed at his own
family members in which racist drawings, slurs and threats
were written at the school where his sister and nephews
worked and attended classes, respectively. 24 Though some
may argue that crude, slur-filled drawings or anonymous tracts
may not constitute a true threat, or may only happen rarely and
therefore not be a widespread enough issue for laws to be spe
cifically directed at racially biased speech, for critical race the
orists, the association of such speech with lynching and racial
discrimination, and the extreme fear caused by being targeted
by such speech, warrants laws that explicitly target racial hate
speech. Lawrence notes that hate speech has a silencing effect
on those it targets; although supposedly still free to speak, the
shock of being the target of hate speech renders the person tar
geted unable to respond or participate in the discussion at
hand, as was the case for one of Lawrence's students, who
23 Lawrence et. al, 7.
24 Charles R. Lawrence III, "If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus" in Words That Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J.
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 73.
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found himself unable to respond when being verbally attacked
for being gay.e25 This demonstrates another side of the critical
race theorists' argument for hate speech regulation, which is
that the regulation of hate speech may actually be more con
ducive to a culture of free, open discussion.
Critical race theorists do not necessarily agree on the
extent to which hate speech should be regulated by law; Mari
J. Matsuda, for example, argues that hate speech restriction
should focus on speech where "the message is of racial inferi
ority. . . the message is directed at a historically oppressed
group . . . [and] the message is persecutory, hateful, and degrad
ing." 26 Such a definition of hate speech, although appealing to
those who support the critical race theorists' goals, would nat
urally create the problem of one-sided debate that Justice
Scalia warned of in RA. V. and would likely be too broad a
definition of hate speech to successfully use for legislation.
On the other hand, Charles R. Lawrence III advocates legisla
tion that defines proscribable speech simply as "face-to-face
racial vilification." 27 Lawrence's description of such speech
echoes the "fighting words" doctrine mentioned above, which
was first presented by the United States Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, but focuses it directly at ra
cially biased hate speech. In fact, Lawrence's definition of
hate speech would support a law almost exactly like the law
thrown out in RA. V.; it seems that in response to the court's
decision, Lawrence would counter that racially biased hate
speech can be specifically targeted as long as the law is
worded in a way that allows both sides of any race debate to
have protection. Based on Lawrence's definition, it does not
25 Lawrence, "If He Hollers Let Him Go," 53.
Mari J. Matsuda, "Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider
ing the Victim's Story" in Words that Wound: Critical Race The
ory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J.
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 36.
27 Lawrence, "If He Hollers Let Him Go," 87.

26
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matter if one is a member of a racial group that has been his
torically ostracized or has historically been the one that ostra
cizes-Lawrence, unlike Matsuda, does not specify that hate
speech regulation should punish only hate speech directed at
members of historically oppressed racial groups, and in this
way better avoids the one-sidedness that Scalia lamented in
R.A. V. while still advocating for law that restricts racial hate
speech as a category.
Modern Counter-Arguments to Critical Race Theorists
Modem defenders of free speech who oppose critical
race theorists present a number of reasons not to legislate
against racially biased hate speech beyond those provided in
the Supreme Court's decisions and by Mill.
First, some opponents of hate speech regulation coun
ter that government regulations on racist hate speech are un
warranted because such regulations deny respect for the au
tonomy of the speaker, which is a key foundation for the
legitimacy of our government. As C. Edwin Baker argues, "the
legitimacy of the state depends on its respect for people's
equality and autonomy and . . . as a purely formal matter, the
state only respects people's autonomy if it allows people in
their speech to express their own values - no matter what these
values are."28 That is to say, a government is only legitimate if
it allows people to speak their mind completely and to make
choices for themselves in what to think, even if their ideas are
hateful and offensive. It follows from this that to restrict hate
speech, although it may appear to be a good decision, would
be to destroy the legitimacy of the government. Baker agrees
with critical race theorists that the government must also pro
tect the equality of its citizens, but he adds that this does not
28

C. Edwin Baker, "Autonomy and Hate Speech," in Extreme
Speech and Democracy, ed. Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, (Ox
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 142.
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mean that the government should punish private citizens for
saying things that "[do] not respect others' equality and dig
nity." 29 Such speech is, to Baker, a matter of choice and per
sonal belief, rather than a substantial infringement on the
rights of minorities, and therefore the government should not
have a say in what people say and believe. The tendency of
past governments to dictate what people could or could not say
and believe is the reason we have today developed such a
strong aversion to speech regulation, and to Baker there is
more substantial ground to argue that the governments' re
striction of hate speech infringes on a person's right to auton
omy than to argue that an individual's use of hate speech in
fringes on the rights of the individual (or group) targeted by
the hate speech.
Another opponent of hate speech regulation, John T.
Bennett, also addresses critical race theorists' arguments for
hate speech regulation. In addition to arguing that government
should not dictate what can or cannot be said, Bennett ques
tions the evidence of harms from hate speech. Bennett does
not deny that there is any evidence whatsoever of harm from
hate speech; however, he denies that this evidence is so strong
as to warrant hate speech regulation. Bennett asserts that one
such harm attributed to hate speech, which is social inequality,
is not attributable to hate speech and racism after all, but rather
to "cultural norms that are unrelated to racism."30 Bennett calls
this view the "cultural perspective" and explains that "the cul
tural perspective finds that. . . various inequalities are caused in
large part by the distinct norms, habits, and lifestyles of differ
ent people within different communities."3 1 Bennett claims in
29 Baker, "Autonomy and Hate Speech," 143.
John T. Bennett, "The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation," Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 43 (2016): 478, https://advance
lexis-com.libproxy.furman.edu/api/permalink/57c4e61b-1fl0416a-bfl 3-9586bfilbeb9e/?context= 1516831.
31
Bennett, "The Harm in Hate Speech," 468.
30
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opposition to critical race theorists that inequality as it exists
in the United States today is not caused by inherent structural
racism, but rather by "varying norms, habits, preferences, and
conscious decisions" taken by members of the minority racial
groups that currently experience unequal outcomes compared
to members of the majority racial group.32 Put more simply,
Bennett argues that the inequality experienced today by people
who have historically been discriminated against because of
their race is not because of the lingering effects of racism in
society; instead, he argues that minorities have caused the cur
rent inequality through their own decisions, and implies that
blaming these problems on racism, and specifically racist
speech, is to shift the focus onto the wrong problem.
Bennett explains further that another harm attributed
to hate speech, psycho-emotional harm, is also problematic,
because it is a difficult harm to measure, because it is inher
ently subjective, and because, according to him, research into
this harm does not show that hate speech causes long-term
psychological harm.33 He writes, in an explanation of a study
which attempted to determine whether hate speech negatively
impacts self-esteem of young Blacks in the long term using
data gathered between 1960 and 1998, "if hate speech in
American society is causing psycho-emotional harm, this has
not led to a measurable impact on self-reported self-esteem."34
Bennett does not deny that those who are targeted by hate
speech experience any harm whatsoever, but rather argues that
the evidence of long-lasting harm is not strong enough to war
rant the level of strict hate speech regulation some critical race
theorists want.
Bennett also notes that critical race theorists use em
pirical data which is gathered by academics who "suffer from
32
33
34

Bennett, 469.
Bennett, "The Harm in Hate Speech," 487.
Bennett, 487.
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deeply rooted and longstanding ideological bias."3 5 Bennett
explains that this bias takes two forms: first, he claims that
many proponents of hate speech regulation "exaggerate the
prevalence of racism and sexism in American life," even as
racism itself has declined and anti-racism has become the
norm.3 6 Second, Bennett notes that this bias results in the ex
clusion of conservative academics, who (like Bennett) might
question the prevalence of hate speech and the necessity to
regulate it. 37 According to Bennett, the currently accepted
opinion on hate speech among academics has already created
a culture of speech where, even though certain ideas and
speech may not be illegal, people are afraid to speak their
minds because of the possibility of being socially punished
not for using racially-charged hate speech, but rather for argu
ing that such speech may not need to be regulated.
Both Baker and Bennett also address the argument
that hate speech causes harm, and must therefore be regulated,
by countering that hate speech regulations may worsen the
problems that proponents of hate speech regulations want to
fix. For example, Bennett notes that hate speech regulations
would be likely to negatively impact racial harmony in the
United States. He explains that "if hate speech laws were en
acted, reasonable people would perceive racial favoritism in
their implementation," meaning that hate speech regulation
would be likely to increase animosity between racial groups,
because such regulations, as presented by scholars such as
Matsuda, would likely favor one racial group over another. 3 8
Baker agrees with this, noting that "speech prohibitions can
increase . . . racist individuals' or groups' sense of oppression
and, thereby, sense that they must act."3 9 He also asserts that
35
36
37
38
39

Bennett, 471.
Bennett, 474.
Bennett, 473.
Bennett, ""The Harm in Hate Speech," 531.
Baker, "Autonomy and Hate Speech," 152.
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regulation of hate speech will make it more difficult to identify
potential perpetrators of racial violence, because such regula
tions will force proponents of hate speech to go underground
and thereby become harder to trace. 40 So, instead of hate
speech regulation protecting minority groups from harm,
Baker and Bennett argue that hate speech regulations will ul
timately cause more harm.
My Response to the Above Arguments
My own view on hate speech regulation recognizes
that freedom of speech is a necessary and important freedom
in any country that claims to value the rights of the people who
live there; however, I agree with the critical race theorists that
racially biased hate speech should be an exception to the rule
and that states can legitimately write laws that punish extreme
racial hate speech.
Before completely laying out my own view, I need to
respond to the arguments against hate speech restriction that
were presented above. First, in response to Mill: Mill argues
that all speech must be allowed in order to pursue truth. Alt
hough I agree that the search for truth is important, I think it is
difficult to argue that hate speech seriously contributes to the
pursuit of truth. Of course, there is a possibility of discrimina
tory, racist speech which may appear to contribute to this
search for truth, such as in a story that Mari Matsuda calls
"The Case of the Dead-Wrong Social Scientist," in which a
racist argument is portrayed as having scientific backing and
is presented in a classroom or lecture setting, thereby bearing
resemblance to actual academic debate and pursuit of truth. 4 1
However, I think even Mill would be hard-pressed to show
what benefit or hint of the truth could be found in yelling de
rogatory names, burning crosses in black families' yards, or
40
41

Baker, 152.

Matsuda, "Public Response to Racist Speech," 40-41.
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drawing pictures of swastikas outside dorm rooms. At least the
social scientist, in presenting his racially biased views in an
academic manner, puts forth his argument in the kind of set
ting that allows for discussion; that is to say, by presenting his
views in an academic setting, he seems to invite the possibility
of the kind of discussion of ideas Mill wants us to have. On
the other hand, racist speech that takes the form of a slur, a
display of a hateful symbol, or an act of vandalism does not
ask for engagement; it seeks to intimidate others into fear and
silence.
Also, banning hate speech and banning disagreement
are not necessarily the same thing. Or, they do not have to be.
Part of the fear addressed above is that hate speech will be so
broadly defined as to include speech that should be protected,
including speech that is merely in opposition to the prevailing
view. This is one of the potential problems with Matsuda's
definition of hate speech. A number of claims made specifi
cally by Bennett could be considered racist by his readers, re
gardless of whether he is trying to be racist or not, and there
are those would argue that all even vaguely racist speech is
hate speech. Such an argument would make it possible for
these readers to accuse Bennett of hate speech, even though it
seems a stretch to call what he says hate speech compared to
the more extreme examples of hate speech already mentioned.
This reveals a need to define hate speech specifically, in order
to avoid creating a culture where those who may not intend to
cause harm feel like they cannot speak, because they cannot
ask questions or challenge prevailing views without being ac
cused of hate speech. For this reason, I find myself leaning
toward Lawrence's definition of hate speech as "face-to-face
racial vilification.',42 However, I would ensure the definition
included acts that might not be strictly face-to-face, such as
posting up a poster with demeaning racial images, or display
ing symbols, such as the swastika or a burning cross, which
42
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would likely cause emotional harm by their proximity to mem
bers of minority groups. Either way, a narrower definition of
hate speech would allow those with unpopular, and even po
tentially racist, opinions to still speak their opinions-they just
would not be able to use words that inherently harm or silence
others in order to express these opinions.
Of course, narrowly defining hate speech and recog
nizing that hate speech does not contribute to a pursuit of truth
does not seem enough to satisfy Baker and Bennett. Baker says
that the government must respect its citizens' autonomy by al
lowing them to speak their opinions freely and argues that this
respect must be maintained "irrespective of how this expres
sive content harms other people.',43 This may just be an unfor
tunate wording, although it is interesting that, when presenting
possible evidence that might convince him that hate speech
regulation would be beneficial, Baker only suggests that he
would be convinced by evidence showing that hate speech in
cites racist acts (by racists), and he does not mention that he
would be convinced if he was shown evidence that hate speech
harmed its targets in and of itself. 44 Allowing someone to
speak even if it causes harm to another person seems to go
directly against the purpose of government. I agree with Baker
that the government must respect the autonomy of its citizens;
however, the law must put some limits on a person's autonomy
in order to protect other people; this is, of course, why there
are laws against stealing and murder, and why pedophiles can
not use the argument of sexual autonomy to justify sexual acts
with minors. A person's freedom of choice to act ends when
their action harms another person.
Hidden within Baker's statement that speech must be
freely allowed regardless of harm, is the argument that speech
does not cause true harm in the same way that murder, steal
ing, and sexual abuse cause harm. This is interesting, as Baker
43
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seemingly disagrees with the Supreme Court's decision in
Chaplinsky, because the Court's definition of fighting words,
as quoted above, recognizes that certain words can cause
harm.
Bennett's specific arguments against hate speech, on
the other hand, are somewhat more controversial. First, his ar
gument that inequality is not caused by racism seems quite
false; even if it is true that not all current inequality is caused
directly by racism, there are cases where racism can be shown
to underly situations of inequality. This can be seen specifi
cally in the higher incarceration rates of Blacks for drug
crimes, despite whites being a larger portion of the drug user
population, as well as in more severe sentences for Blacks ver
sus whites when similar crimes are committed. 45 Second, Ben
nett, unlike Baker, allows that hate speech may cause actual
harm to those targeted by it, but he denies that it is enough
harm to warrant restriction. It is interesting to note that the
study Baker uses to demonstrate that hate speech does not
cause long-term harm focuses on the impact of hate speech on
self-esteem, and does not address other long-term psycho
emotional harms that may occur, such as fear of going to cer
tain locations (such as a classroom or a dorm where one was
subject to hate speech). It seems both Bennett and Baker reject
the personal experience of those targeted by racist hate speech.
If you ask the Black family who was directly targeted by the
burning cross at the heart of the controversy in RA. V. v. St.
Paul, would they say there was no long-term psychological
harm? In the example mentioned above, in which Lawrence's
family was targeted by racist drawings, he writes that, on vis-
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iting his family after the incident, the pain and injury was ob
vious, that "their faces betrayed the aftershock of a recently
inflicted blow and a newly discovered vulnerability."46 Could
Bennett and Baker deny that such an experience would not
have long-term effects on Lawrence's family, especially the
children who realized they went to school with people who
were willing to say such things about them? It is possible that
more commonplace, subtle racist speech may not have meas
urable long-term effects (although I am not totally convinced
this is true), but it seems difficult and wrong to deny the indi
vidual experience of those targeted directly by the most violent
and direct instances of hate speech.
The question also arises of why it matters to have ra
cially biased hate speech regulation specifically, if such hate
speech could fall under legislation, such as the law in Virginia,
that regulates fighting words in general. Simply proscribing
hate speech within more general fighting words laws might
appeal to Bennett, since, as discussed above, he says that rea
sonable people will see restrictions that specifically regulate
hate speech as favoring one side over another, and that aca
demics who support such legislation are deeply biased. Ben
nett is probably right in saying that racial hate speech ordi
nances will tend to favor one side over another, even if not
written in a way that asks for such one-sided application, see
ing as it likely would be more difficult (but not impossible) for
a white person to show that she is the victim of hate speech
than it would be for a Black person, Jewish person, or person
of any other minority group. It is also more likely that people
of color will bring up allegations of hate speech and win, be
cause people of color are more often targeted by hate speech
and hate crimes (however, it should be noted again that whites
would also be able to be recognized as victims of hate speech
under the kind of hate speech laws I am arguing for, just as
whites can and have been recognized as victims of hate crimes
46
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under current hate crime laws). 47 This seemingly unfair appli
cation comes about because derogatory speech and symbols
directed at a white person do not carry with them the same
history of oppression that such speech directed at a person of
another race would. However, this same history of oppression
is exactly what motivates those academics who support hate
speech regulation. They may appear to be biased, but this is
because most critical race theorists are themselves members of
minority groups who have experienced extreme discrimina
tion in United States history; in a sense, regulation specifically
directed at hate speech is a small way of making up for the
hundreds of years in which people of color were excluded
from government, openly discriminated against, enslaved, and
beaten all because of their ethnicity and skin color.
Again, I admit that this sort of argument can be
viewed as biased against a specific category of disfavored
speech; however, I do not think there is inherently something
wrong with different treatment of disfavored speech in this
case. Hate speech is different from other sorts of disfavored
speech, such as anti-government and anti-war speech, which
have also been historically been targeted by speech regulation
in the United States. 48 The latter two forms of speech are po
litical speech which attack the government and can reasonably
be seen to contribute to the search for truth because of their
nature as political speech. However, racially biased hate
speech specifically attacks people based on nothing other than
their race, and, as mentioned above, cannot reasonably be con
sidered a part of the search for truth.
I need to also address Baker and Bennett's arguments
that hate speech regulation will unintentionally cause more
47
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harm. Bennett's reason for this argument relates to the argu
ment just mentioned, which is that "reasonable people would
perceive racial favoritism in their implementation."49 As I al
ready said, I think this is true, but I also think many reasonable
people are capable of recognizing that the problem addressed
by hate speech regulation carries with it a history that allows
for an exception to the rule that law cannot be biased against
certain ideas. And even if reasonable people disagree with this
(I will not claim that Bennett or Baker are unreasonable peo
ple), they are unlikely to lash out at minority groups if hate
speech laws are enacted. The problem, then, seems to lie with
unreasonable people; that is to say, those who want to use the
most violent hate speech: hate groups, such as Neo-Nazis and
white supremacists. As mentioned before, Baker says that hate
speech regulation will cause such unreasonable people to feel
attacked and "increase . . . [their] sense that they must act," as
well as force them to move underground where their ideas can
fester. 50 This is a difficult argument to counter. First, I argue
that hate speech regulation would not necessarily force these
groups entirely underground, because, as I have already ad
mitted, I do not think that hate speech regulation can be
worded to include every instance of racist speech, but only the
most hurtful forms of direct racial vilification. Second, if by
increasing the sense that they must act, Baker means that these
groups will be prompted to use more violence, then that simply
goes to show that racist ideas in fact are still prevalent enough
to cause concern, which disproves Bennett's assertion that rac
ism is no longer a big enough issue to warrant hate speech leg
islation. Also, even though hate groups might claim that being
targeted by hate speech regulation is a legitimate reason to use
violence, such an argument would not hold up in any court.
This may show that the government needs to do a better job of
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identifying and monitoring those who might be likely to com
mit hate crimes, but it does not show that we should not protect
the victims of hate speech by directly punishing hate speech
through legislation. It seems more important to protect those
that are actually harmed by hate speech, rather than those who
might perceive that they are somehow harmed by its regula
tion.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the debate over hate speech regulation is
difficult to resolve, and it is admittedly likely that racism will
find ways to persist even if we accept the need for hate speech
regulation and enact laws restricting such speech. Despite
these difficulties, the battle to criminalize hate speech is wor
thy to be fought, as it provides a way for the United States and
its state governments to both protect minorities from the very
real harm that comes from being targeted by hate speech and
to legally recognize the crimes such speech has historically en
couraged and embodied as wrong. The goal of hate speech re
striction is not to end debate; hate speech regulation, specifi
cally limited to racially-biased fighting words and "face-to
face vilification," will still allow for free expression of even
racist ideas; but it will require that the expression of such ideas
not occur in such a way to inflict harm on the minority groups
who have already suffered so much harm throughout United
States history. I would love to live in a world where hate
speech regulation is not necessary, but as I have shown, we do
not yet live in such a world. It is for these reasons that I not
only argue we need hate speech regulation, but that I also dis
agree with the Court's decisions in R.A. V and Virginia and
conclude that the Court should allow future such laws to re
main in place, rather than declare them unconstitutional.
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